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Viewing cable 05DUBLIN936, UPDATE ON IRA MONEY-LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DUBLIN936 2005-07-27 16:04 2010-12-12 23:11 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dublin
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
Wednesday, 27 July 2005, 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000936 
SIPDIS 
LONDON FOR POL AND LEGATT 
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS PREL, EFIN, SOCI, KCRM, EI, NIPP 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON IRA MONEY-LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION 
REF: A. STATE 104288
 B. DUBLIN 210  C. SOFIA 1108
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary: Irish criminal justice officials are convinced that pound sterling notes seized in Dublin and Cork in mid-February in an apparent IRA-tied money-laundering scheme was money stolen from Belfast’s Northern Bank. Police are attempting to establish forensic links between the seizures and robbery in order to bring charges by late 2005, with a court case to follow a year later. Irish investigators continue to pursue a possible Bulgarian link to the money-laundering scheme, but are reluctant to provide details on exchanges with Bulgarian counterparts. The Bulgarian Ambassador in Dublin denies any Bulgarian involvement and wishes that Ireland would close off this line of inquiry publicly. Irish officials, more generally, remain concerned that IRA funds acquired through sophisticated investments are seeping into resources available for Sinn Fein’s political activities in the Republic of Ireland. Post expects that Irish officials will remain reticent on details of the money-laundering investigation until charges are filed. End summary.
Linking the Bank Robbery and Money Seizures
------------------------------------------- 
2. (C) The roughly STG 3 million seized in Dublin and Cork the week of February 14 (ref B) is “beyond doubt” a portion of the STG 26.5 million stolen from Belfast’s Northern Bank on December 20, 2004, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and  the Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (DOJ)XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX related to Emboff the GOI’s belief that up to 16 individuals questioned by Garda (police) in connection with the seizures were attempting to launder the stolen proceeds on behalf of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This belief was based on information provided by Garda intelligence assets and by “walk-ins” who, in some instances, voluntarily turned over cash that they had been asked to hide (STG 300,000 in one case). While intelligence pointed clearly to a money-laundering operation, the challenge was to build forensic ties between the money seized and the stolen Northern Bank notes in order to support a court conviction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Garda, led by the Criminal Assets Bureau, were still attempting to establish forensic links through the tracking system used by the Northern Bank for bank note bundles in its possession at the time of December robbery.
3. (C) If such ties could be established before autumn, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), James Hamilton, would be in a position to bring money-laundering charges by late 2005 against a number of those questioned, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. (To date, no one has been charged, except a XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was charged with membership in the IRA, an illegal organization. XXXXXXXXXXXX Once charges are brought, it would likely take a year to begin the court case. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Hamilton could possibly opt for a special non-jury criminal court consisting of three judges, an option that was sometimes used for cases involving unlawful organizations like the IRA. When Emboff asked who would likely face charges, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, of those brought in for Garda questioning, no one had been ruled out as beyond suspicion XXXXXXXXXXXX He added that the operative legislation in the case would likely be the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1997, rather than the Criminal Justice Act of 2005, since the latter focused primarily on terrorism.
4. (C) In separate discussions with the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboffs, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that investigations into the money-laundering case could still take several months, as police used DNA and other scientific techniques to pursue a connection to the Northern Bank raid. He commented that the money-laundering operation had been poorly conducted, due most likely to the unexpected size of the bank haul. Investigators were focused primarily on Ted Cunningham and XXXXXXXXXXXX

----------------------- 
 XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX

----------------------------------- 
7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX
--------------------------------- 
8. (C) More generally, the DOJ and Garda continue to be concerned that money illegally acquired by the IRA was “seeping” into resources available for Sinn Finn’s political activities in the Republic of Ireland, said the DOJXXXXXXXXXXXX. The difficulty lay in documenting the mixing of such funds. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) was similarly concerned that political donations obtained by Sinn Fein in the United States and elsewhere overseas were being spent in the South. (Under a 2002 SIPO ruling, Sinn Fein can accept donations from non-Irish citizens in foreign countries, but only for activities outside the Republic of Ireland, i.e., in Northern Ireland.) He noted that the DOJ would be interested to see whether and how the IRA might address criminality in its expected response to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams’ call for an end to republican paramilitarism. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the awaited IRA statement would have no bearing on the money-laundering case or other investigations into possible IRA crimes committed since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that IRA money was constantly moving, flowing from diversified sources into wide-ranging investments. While the IRA had been proficient in smuggling, robbery, and racketeering since the 1970s, the Celtic Tiger economic boom of the 1990s had prompted the IRA to diversify into more sophisticated business enterprises. IRA investments now included real estate ventures in Dublin, London, and Spanish resort areas, handled by apparently respectable businessmen. XXXXXXXXXXXX also expressed concern about the commingling of ill-gotten IRA funds with Sinn Fein’s political coffers in the Republic of Ireland. The irony, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, was that Sinn Fein was already raising substantial sums for its political activities in the South through legal avenues. He pointed out, for example, that Sinn Fein conducted at least 60 fund-raisers in the South per week for its electoral war chest.
Comment: GOI Reticence
---------------------- 
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to Emboffs that the ongoing investigation into the money-laundering case constrained their ability to provide more information, as the lack of detail in their observations bears out. We expect that GOI officials will remain reticent until charges are actually filed, a step that may also be delayed by continuing investigations into the Northern Bank robbery itself. Garda and DOJ representatives are also likely to continue to be quiet in public and in discussions with us regarding funding of Sinn Fein,s activities in the Republic of Ireland. As a political force in the South, Sinn Fein has limited reach, but is seen as the most well-organized and best-funded party. Competing parties, including the governing Fianna Fail party, are anxious to ensure that Sinn Fein members/supporters abide by Irish law and are subject to public scrutiny when they do not. Both the Garda (traditionally tough on the republican movement writ large, due to its terrorist connections) and political levels of the government will be careful to avoid the public perception that any legal pursuit of Sinn Fein/IRA-tied personalities in the South is politically connected. KENNY