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Viewing cable 07KABUL1132, ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS’ MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL1132 2007-04-06 10:10 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO7063
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1132/01 0961045
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061045Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7308
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001132 

SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR 
STATE FOR INL/AP, INL/FO, AND INR 
CIA FOR CNC 

EO 12958 DECL: 04/04/2017 
TAGS SNAR, KCRM, AF 
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS’ MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO 
AFGHANISTAN
REF: KABUL 1014

Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) SUMMARY: Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy John Walters visited Afghanistan March 17-20 to discuss with senior Afghan and international officials this year’s progress on reducing the poppy crop. Senior ISAF officials told Walters that although eradicating poppy would, in their estimation, increase the security threat, it needed to be done and they would be as supportive as their mandate allowed. ISAF is also increasingly convinced of the links between narcotics traffickers and insurgents. Senior Afghan government officials agreed with the need to take strong action against growers and traffickers but acknowledged that widespread corruption and the weakness of the justice system made that difficult. Many made the point that considerable progress in other parts of the country was at risk of being overshadowed by the lack of progress in Helmand. They all emphasized the importance of increasing development aid, and pitched the idea of funneling more assistance through government ministries instead of international contractors. Lastly, Walters visited the Afghan Eradication Force base camp in Helmand, where discussions with Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics Mohammad Daud and local elders illustrated how difficult it is for the central government to exert its authority on controversial issues. END SUMMARY.

KARZAI NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION
--------------------------- 

2. (C/NOFORN) ONDCP Director Walters met with COM ISAF General McNeill in Kabul, and separately with RC South Commander Major General Van Loon (Dutch) in Kandahar. McNeill told Walters there had been a lot of action on counter-narcotics, but little progress. He was particularly dismayed by the British effort. They had made a mess of things in Helmand, their tactics were wrong, and the deal that London cut on Musa Qala had failed. That agreement opened the door to narco-traffickers in that area, and now it was impossible to tell the difference between the traffickers and the insurgents. The British could do a lot more, he said, and should, because they have the biggest stake.

3. (C/NOFORN) McNeill thought the missing ingredient in the counter-narcotics effort was Karzai. Despite some public statements, he had failed to take a real stand. Karzai needed to keep his support base happy, and as a result, he placated many of those involved in the drug business, especially in the west and south of the country. However, by not taking the issue on, Karzai was tacitly signaling his OK for poppy production. While the international community could come down harder on Karzai, McNeill observed that for the time being, Karzai is the only one who can lead, so for now we have to ride with him. The counter-narcotics effort has to have an Afghan face, and that is going to take time.

HIGH VALUE TARGETS
------------------ 

4. (C) To Walters’ question on going after high value targets, McNeill said it was necessary to prosecute a few to keep faith with the general public. But he was skeptical it would have any real effect on the trafficking networks, as those arrested would simply be replaced by others. McNeill described having been called to answer questions before the Afghan parliament, and said that during the session, the parliament had come down hard on MOI Zarar for not doing more on narcotics arrests and basic law enforcement. McNeill also criticized the timing and conduct of eradication, arguing that farmers eradicated in the spring would be fighting by summer. He asserted that Governor-led eradication was extremely disorganized and said that, for now, eradicators are only going where the local power brokers allow them to go. He suggested that there be a more direct link between eradication and provision of assistance, so that a compact with the people could be created.
KABUL 00001132 002 OF 004

VAN LOON AGREEMENT ON TIMING, NEED FOR ASSISTANCE
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

5. (C) In a meeting the next day in Kandahar, RC South commander Major General Van Loon, who was accompanied for part of the meeting by Kandahar Governor Asadullah, argued that provision of alternative livelihoods needs to start much earlier. Once the poppy seeds are in the ground, there is no option for the farmer. Provision of licit crops and other assistance needed to start early in the summer, before farmers made planting decisions. Both Asadullah and Van Loon thought cooperation among the central government, assistance providers, and eradication elements was poor. While farmers are promised alternatives, they do not often see results on a local level. There needs to be more active involvement with local councils, and there should be more of a direct link between development assistance and non-cultivation of poppy. Van Loon suggested this approach would work in Kandahar, where farmers were making their own decisions on what to grow, but would probably not work in Helmand, where large-scale traffickers were in charge.
GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION AND PROBLEMS OF 

CORRUPTION
--------------------------------------------- ------ 

6. (C) Following Asadullah’s departure, Van Loon agreed that the Governor was making progress on eradication, but he took issue with his targets and methods. Asadullah was using Afghan Police (ANP) to do eradication, which further damaged the already corrupt reputation of the police among average people, and allowed Asadullah to pocket the funding he had been given to hire local labor to carry out eradication. The employment of ANP in eradication means they are not out in the community performing their security functions. In addition, Van Loon said Asadullah has been careful to eradicate only those fields not controlled by powerful people in the Province.

7. (C/NF) Van Loon was somewhat defensive in discussing the failure of Uruzgan Governor Monib to take any action on eradication. He argued that the security situation was outside the Governor’s control, and prevented him from moving around much. In addition, the province is extremely poor, and so until more alternative livelihoods are available, the international community should not push too hard on eradication. He said that Monib understood the need to do something, and plans were now being drawn up with the British Embassy Drugs team and the Ministry of Counter-narcotics.

8. (C) RC South has begun developing information on ties between traffickers, insurgents, and government officials. They recognize that going after corrupt officials may be too difficult, given the delicate tribal and other balances needed to keep the Afghan government generally intact. But they hope to use the increasing connections between traffickers and insurgents to their advantage; the latter are a legitimate target for ISAF, while pursuing the former is not within ISAF’s direct mandate.

VISIT TO HELMAND
---------------- 

9. (C) On March 20 Director Walters visited the INL-funded Afghan Eradication Force’s (AEF) forward operating base in Helmand. During the visit he discussed Helmand eradication with Deputy Interior Minister Daud and members of the provincial eradication commission, who represented tribal elders and the poppy growing communities in the operating areas of the AEF base. Walters told Daud and the commission members that he was disappointed with the recent lack of eradication progress in areas with the highest concentration of poppy cultivation, like Marja sub-district. The commission responded that Helmand needs time--a few growing seasons--to wean farmers away from dependence on the poppy crop. Walters acknowledged that eradication affects farmers, but he reminded the commission that Helmand enjoys other
KABUL 00001132 003 OF 004
agricultural options and has the potential to become Afghanistan’s “bread basket.” All farmers, he said, know that growing poppy is illegal, and they must also learn that poppy cultivation feeds insecurity in the province and throughout Afghanistan.

GOA MINISTERS - MORE ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT
--------------------------------------------- --------- 

10. (C) Walters met over dinner with a number of Afghan officials, including the Ministers of Interior, Agriculture, Counter-narcotics, and Education, the Chief of the National Directorate of Security, and a member of Parliament. The wide-ranging discussion included talks on the kinds of alternative crops that could profitably be grown around the country, the challenge of fighting corruption and creating a functioning judicial system, and the general pre-requisite for licit livelihoods of energy, irrigation, and roads.

11. (C) Two themes emerged. First, there should be much more active involvement by local government in decision-making on what kind of assistance is provided. Billions are being spent around the country, but the perception at the local level is that little is being done. Involving local government, whether through Provincial Development Councils, the Governors, or other mechanisms, will help address this problem. Second, Ministers unanimously called for more assistance to be channeled through the government, rather than through international contractors. They argued that unless this happened, capacity in the Ministries would never be built. It would also lead the population to conclude that central government officials, rather than Taliban or other insurgents, could deliver now and in the future. While all acknowledged the challenges of maintaining accountability for vast sums, they argued that at least some measure of assistance should be disbursed in this way.

COMMENT
------- 

12. (C) Director Walters’ meetings with GOA and international community officials highlighted the complexity of Afghanistan’s poppy dilemma. Little consensus exists on how to solve the problem: the GOA wants time, more development assistance, and greater discretion on how to spend development funding; ISAF wants to see poppy elimination programs become more integrated with security strategy; the UK Embassy argues for incremental improvements within a broader capacity-building enterprise. These debates rage within a political environment where power is diffuse and Kabul competes for regional and local influence with provincial offices and tribal structures. Every decision requires inordinate time and effort as we work to broker agreements between competing interests.

13. (C) In the background, the poppy continues to grow, and Walters’ aerial surveillance of rich poppy fields in Helmand offered immediate and powerful visual evidence of the scope of the problem. The difficulties of eradicating poppy in the same area where complex ISAF military operations are in full swing were also exposed. The long-term challenges are immense but should not overshadow the short-term necessity of political engagement, and Director Walters’ visit highlighted the great importance of making poppy elimination one of the GOA’s central priorities. No one ministry can win this battle alone. It requires concerted government will, and President Karzai needs to take control of this effort and publicize its importance for all of Afghanistan. Ambassador stressed this point during President Karzai’s counter-narcotics meeting on March 27 (reftel). As of the first week in April, we are approaching the end game of this season,s eradication efforts in Helmand and will soon be evaluating the campaign’s impact in the light of Walters’ observations during his recent visit. END COMMENT

14. (U) Director Walters’s party cleared this cable.
KABUL 00001132 004 OF 004
NEUMANN