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Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE655, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: NEW DEFENSE MINISTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07THEHAGUE655 2007-04-10 15:03 2011-01-17 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0655/01 1001502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101502Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8791
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2645
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0263
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017 
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: NEW DEFENSE MINISTER 
SETTLES IN 
 
Cl...



103825,4/10/2007 15:02,07THEHAGUE655,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0655/01 1001502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101502Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8791
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2645
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0263
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000655
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: NEW DEFENSE MINISTER
SETTLES IN
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: In his introductory meeting with Ambassador
Arnall, new Dutch Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop
stressed the importance of success in Afghanistan. He
repeated official policy regarding the Dutch two-year
commitment in Uruzgan province, and anticipated a fierce
debate this summer within the coalition and with parliament
regarding a possible extension in some capacity past August
2008. However, he suggested that completely leaving Uruzgan
""made little sense"" after investing two years worth of time
and resources, and that the Dutch could possibly team with
another NATO ally in Uruzgan or continue its partnership with
Australia under different terms. Van Middelkoop added that
any perceived U.S. pressure could backfire in both parliament
and the Dutch public. He also expressed views on a possible
Dutch deployment to Africa, and continued Dutch participation
in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Van Middelkoop
discussed these issues with Ambassador Arnall on April 10.
End summary.
Afghanistan: Extension Debate Looming
------------------------------------
2, (C) Van Middelkoop stressed that NATO ""must succeed"" in
Afghanistan. He described his recent visit to Uruzgan with
new Foreign and Development Ministers Maxime Verhagen and
Bert Koenders as ""an investment in ourselves,"" allowing the
Dutch to emphasize the comprehensive, ""3D"" approach balancing
defense, development and diplomacy efforts. He was quick to
add, however, that the comprehensive approach was ""not
uniquely a Dutch one,"" especially as the United States does
some aspects far better than the Netherlands -- the USG
deserves compliments as well, he said. Van Middelkoop said
cooperation in southern Afghanistan was going ""very well,""
but added that the Dutch need more strategic airlift. He
said he raised the possibility of helicopter support with
NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and questioned whether the
United States might be able to help in that capacity.
3. (C) Van Middelkoop turned discussion to the possibility of
extending the Dutch deployment in some role beyond its
two-year commitment to August 2008. He acknowledged the GONL
will make an extension decision by the end of the summer, and
anticipated a fierce debate with parliament. Complicating
the issue, he said, were differing points of view within the
coalition government. He said ""officially,"" the Dutch are
committed until 2008, and that NATO is responsible for
replacing the Dutch should they decide to leave. Personally,
he argued that the Netherlands is a NATO member and is
therefore also responsible for finding an ally to replace it
should the GONL decide to leave. Moreover, it did not make
sense in his view to invest ""so much time, energy and
resources"" in Uruzgan for two years, and then opt to
completely leave Uruzgan.
4. (C) If the Dutch did choose to extend, van Middelkoop
acknowledged they would not be able to continue their
deployment at its current capacity. ""We are at our limits,""
van Middelkoop said, ""if we extend, it will be in a smaller
role."" He acknowledged the possibility of teaming with
another ally past 2008, and said the Dutch were actively
pursuing this possibility. Another option might be for
Australia to take the lead in Uruzgan, he added. That said,
he stressed the importance of avoiding the perception
publicly that the United States and others were pressuring
the Dutch to extend -- this had the potential of backfiring
should parliament and the Dutch public believe the United
States was pushing the Dutch. Amb. Arnall concurred, and
added that the Dutch press is keen to create the perception
of USG pressure. He noted that in a recent interview with
visiting Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried, a Dutch
reporter asked 22 different ways how the United States was
pressuring the Netherlands to extend despite Fried's best
attempts to assure him otherwise.
Africa: Next Stop After Afghanistan?
------------------------------------
5. (C) Amb. Arnall noted the strong interest by coalition
government partner Labor Party (PvdA) to become more involved
in Africa, and asked whether this might deter the Dutch from
extending in Afghanistan. Van Middelkoop acknowledged
Labor's desires to ""go to Africa,"" highlighted by Development
Minister Koenders' strong interest in the continent.
However, he stressed that such interest has ""not yet become a
real issue."" ""We are currently committed to Afghanistan --
that is our concrete responsibility,"" he said. He noted that
the Dutch Ministry of Defense was in the very formative
stages of reviewing options in Africa -- none of which should
distract from the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan.
JSF: The Reason He is Defense Minister
--------------------------------------
6. (C) On the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), van Middelkoop
repeated the government coalition accord language honoring
all previous commitments to JSF contingent upon a
third-party, independent review of the business case early
next year, while making a procurement decision by 2010.
Regarding procurement, he said the Dutch will look at JSF and
alternatives, i.e., the EuroFighter, but added that none of
them posed ""any serious threat"" to JSF. He acknowledged that
there is some cause for caution, given the fact that the
Labor Party opposed participating in the production,
sustainment and follow-on phase of the program. However, he
pointed to Labor's acceptance of the coalition accord as a
positive sign. ""Quite frankly,"" he said, ""the reason I am
Defense Minister today is that the Labor Party did not want
to be in charge of the Ministry of Defense when the Dutch
government finally agreed to buy JSF.""
Comment
-------
7. (C) Van Middelkoop, from the government coalition minority
member Christian Union party, appeared relaxed and in good
spirits regarding his new position -- ""who ever thought that
my small Christian party would ever be in the government --
let alone that I would be Defense Minister,"" he laughed. Yet
van Middelkoop clearly knew his portfolio and spoke
confidently on Afghanistan. Speaking frankly on the
transatlantic relationship, he said ""perhaps we have missed
some chances on bridging the gap, but look how well we are
working together in Afghanistan."" To date, he has been
publicly reticent, preferring to reiterate official policy.
However, if his private comments on Afghanistan are any
indication, he will play a key role in determining whether
the Dutch will continue their deployment in some capacity
past August 2008.
ARNALL