Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 4040 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1118, TURKISH AMBASSADOR: THEIR TRILATERALS, FRIENDS,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD1118.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD1118 2009-05-24 06:06 2010-12-01 23:11 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO1821
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1118/01 1440623
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 240623Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2872
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4400
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0323
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0414
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4933
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1676
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7276
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6215
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001118 

SIPDIS 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/23/2019 
TAGS PGOV, PREF, EAID, MOPS, PHUM, MARR, PREL, PK, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR: THEIR TRILATERALS, FRIENDS, 
NATO, IDP AID, AND NAWAZ

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador, accompanied by EmbOffs, met May 20 with Turkish Ambassador Soysal and other Turkish counterparts. The Turkish Embassy, which has taken on a coordinating role for NATO in Pakistan, advocated greater cooperation with the U.S. vis-a-vis Pakistan. Soysal described Turkey’s own trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan. He thought the Af-Pak relationship had improved since the February 2008 elections and credited Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi in particular for this “geographic sensitivity.” While Turkey hoped their trilaterals would result in cooperative programs, the real objective was increased trust and transparency between the two neighbors. The trilaterals had matured past joint statements; decisions on specific projects needed to be implemented for the meetings to be worthwhile, Soysal said. Encouragingly, the three countries had already conducted a number of joint training on a range of subjects. Soysal agreed that the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” initiative should not morph into a donors forum, despite the GOP predilection. He believed a strong secretariat, along the lines of a task force model, was needed to ensure the initiative’s policy success. NATO could also contribute to Pakistan’s development, sponsoring education initiatives and professional exchanges.

2. (C) Summary continued: Turkish President Gul would call President Zardari May 22 to offer an aid package for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Soysal focused on the July/August timeframe, which this year includes Ramadan, suggesting Turkish aid may be more post-emergency. So far, Turkey was the only Muslim country to contribute to this humanitarian crisis, though Soysal hoped next week’s Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) would take action. He was frustrated the GOP had no timeline for the offensive in Swat and thought the Army was moving too slowly to initiate operations in the Waziristans before next year. He was not certain Pakistani politics would be so patient and encouraged international missions to push for a non-partisan climate for as long as possible. Most of the responsibility for this, however, rested with Zardari, who needed to employ confidence building measures within his own party and with other parties, especially leading opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). End summary.

3. (S) Turkish Embassy Participants: Ambassador Engin Soysal, DCM Semih Luffu Turgut, Army/Air Attache Colonel Nuri Gayir, Naval Attache Erhan Sensoy, and Second Secretary Ilker Kucukkurt. US Mission Participants: Ambassador Anne Patterson, DCM Jerry Feierstein, RAO Chief John Bennett, Army Attache Scott Taylor, and PolOff Terry Steers-Gonzalez (notetaker).

Their Trilaterals
- - - - - - - - - 

4. (C) Soysal described the trilateral meetings by Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, dating back to April 2007. Those three meetings had been kept relatively “small and focused,” he said; each had its own theme -- (1) dialogue, (2) development, and (3) security and intelligence. The next trilateral meeting, date to be determined, will focus on education. Though Soysal admitted the three countries’ education systems were quite different, the exchange was meant to build trust and transparency. He emphasized the meeting would be formatted as parallel bilateral discussions rather than true trilats.

5. (C) The GOT had witnessed first-hand a deterioration in the relationship between the Karzai-Musharraf administrations over the first three trilaterals, Soysal revealed. Since Zardari’s presidency, he had observed much improved relations, relatively, between the two countries. While President Asif Zardari deserved some recognition for this positive turn, Soysal credited principally Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. They both exhibited “geographic sensitivity,” he added, playing up their moderate Sufi credentials and raising universal and/or conciliatory themes.

6. (C) Soysal was proud the Turkish-sponsored trilaterals had
ISLAMABAD 00001118 002 OF 003
matured beyond joint statements; now, the three countries needed to implement their decisions. There had already been trilateral training opportunities, he added, including on crisis response, counter-narcotics, and public affairs topics. He also mentioned a number of proposals he hoped would materialize soon, including a “joint” community center in Peshawar and a development center in Ankara. He thought the latter would welcome the visits of American experts. Turkey was additionally proposing a trilateral military exercise or war 
game.

7. (S) Ambassador Patterson briefed Soysal on our own recent trilateral summit. The U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan meetings complemented Turkey’s process begun years before. President Zardari had performed well in a high-stakes situation. The Ambassador thought President Obama’s focus on counter-insurgency, good governance, and overall support had been received well by the Pakistanis. The RAO Chief noted that Turkey’s trilateral on Af-Pak intelligence cooperation may have gone better than our own trilateral consultations. The Ambassador highlighted the transit trade agreement and the commitment to increased border controls and cross-border training. Our next trilateral would likely come in October, the Ambassador mentioned.

8. (C) Turkey was receptive to Zardari’s suggestion for a regional summit, not just trilateral, to include all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, said Soysal. He confirmed the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan summit set for May 19 had been postponed to May 24. He recommended Pakistan reach out to even more international partners and suggested Pakistani parliamentarians, not just GOP officials, travel abroad to push Pakistan’s case. Zardari would address NATO members at a special session in June. Of course, Soysal added, Zardari might demur depending on how the Army offensive was going in Swat.

Friends of Pakistan
- - - - - - - - - - 

9. (C) Speaking of the calendar, Soysal turned to the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” initiative, informing the Ambassador that the GOP aimed for a July ministerial in Istanbul. (Comment: We have conveyed to the Turks our own concerns that there is not sufficient time to prepare for a ministerial in mid-July. We will continue to discuss.) The British would likely propose a Friends summit on the margins of the usual September UN General Assembly session of heads of government, Soysal relayed. U.N. Assistant Secretary General Jean Arnault would arrive in Pakistan on May 21; he had attended the Friends/Donors meeting hosted by Japan in late April. Soysal hoped he, as well as the Ambassador, would encourage the GOP to stand-up a secretariat for “Friends.” While the assignment of Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit as GOP POC was positive, Soysal really advocated a taskforce.

10. (C) The DCM stressed that Friends not morph in to a donors forum, which was the GOP’s inclination. Also, membership in the group had expanded and may now be too broad to work as a coherent group, he added. Lastly, it would be up to the GOP to provide the initiative its “strategic vision.” The DCM encouraged the Turkish Ambassador to convey similar messages to the GOP. Soysal concurred: “They have to hear from us.”

Initiatives for NATO
- - - - - - - - - - - 

11. (C) The Turkish Embassy in Islamabad has taken on the task of NATO coordinator, at least on political issues, among members’ missions and with the GOP. In that informal role, Soysal recommended a number of joint initiatives and exchanges. He thought members’ respective ambassadors to NATO should jointly visit Pakistan soon. He also noted Pakistani journalists and academics were being sent on study tours (similar to our International Visitors Program) to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Soysal welcomed U.S. suggestions on suitable Pakistani candidates for the trips. Lastly, he had recently learned that a number of Pakistani universities conducted model U.N. competitions; he felt his and other NATO members’ missions could sponsor such events.
ISLAMABAD 00001118 003 OF 003

12. (C) Turkish Ambassador Soysal noted President Obama’s recent trip to Turkey had been very positive and hoped for increased coordination between our two countries and embassies on a spectrum of issues and beyond traditional fora. He also noted his government’s recent hosting of other Special Representatives to this region.

The IDP Challenge
- - - - - - - - - 

13. (C) The Turkish Ambassador complimented the U.S. on its May 19 announcement to provide $110 million in direct assistance to Pakistan’s internally displaced (IDPs). He revealed Turkish President Abdullah Gul would call Zardari May 22 to offer a support package as well. He hinted that Turkish aid may be geared to the post-emergency phase in August/September, which would also coincide this year with the holy month of Ramadan. Soysal noted that Turkey would be the first (and so far only) Muslim country to assist Pakistan with this humanitarian crisis; he was perplexed that Saudi Arabia had not ponied up yet. The GOT would encourage, at the least, a strong statement of support by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit during the week of May 25 and was hoping other OIC members would kick in contributions, Soysal said.

14. (C) However, it appeared the GOP did not have a clear timeline for the offensive operations in Swat, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Soysal complained. He agreed with the Ambassador that the GOP also needed to identify competent civil administrators to enter recently cleared towns. Soysal was also concerned that the Pakistan Army was moving too slowly to clear militants from other districts and the Waziristan Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). GOP plans were still “broad brush” and may not realistically be implemented, if at all, until the new year, he analyzed. The Ambassador added that 2500 Waziri families had already reportedly fled their homes in anticipation of Army action, but yet, the GOP refused to give international aid organizations access to the nearest settled district of D.I. Khan, forcing families to move north to Peshawar or farther east into Punjab.

Thoughts on Nawaz
- - - - - - - - - 

15. (C) Soysal met one-on-one with opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif in Lahore the week of May 11. Nawaz understood the seriousness of the situation in Swat, Soysal concluded. He reported that Nawaz stated the Taliban should be “eliminated.” Nawaz warned, however, that Pakistan’s democracy needed to deliver soon before the public looked again to alternatives; Soysal did not specify whether Nawaz implied the military or the militants as the likely alternates.

16. (C) While tit-for-tat politics would eventually return, Soysal thought the international community should encourage for as long as possible a non-partisan stance by Pakistan’s political parties. But Zardari held much of the responsibility for setting the tone, Soysal argued. He should bring all parties into major decision-making, host party leaders for a session of the next “Friends” meeting, and reconcile with factions inside his own Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

17. (C) Comment: This was the first meeting between the two embassies in this format, which parallels a similar dialogue we have with the U.K. High Commission. But with the Turks playing an increasingly high profile, constructive role in Pakistan, we will continue to develop our dialogue and find opportunities to work together in areas of mutual interest. As a moderate, progressive Muslim state featuring relatively stable, democratic governance, Turkey is well-positioned to be a much more positive role model for the Pakistanis and to neutralize somewhat the more negative influence on Pakistani politics and society exercised by Saudi Arabia. End comment.
PATTERSON