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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI362, MUSA KUSA SEEKS COOPERATION ON AFRICA, AL-QAEDA -- AND POTUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI362 2009-05-03 06:06 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO4966
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0362/01 1230643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 030643Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4778
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1047
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0731
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5308
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/2/2019 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER LY SU CD
SUBJECT: MUSA KUSA SEEKS COOPERATION ON AFRICA, AL-QAEDA -- AND POTUS 
MEETING WITH AL-QADHAFI 
 
TRIPOLI 000362 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/2/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER LY SU CD

1.(C) Summary: Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told the Ambassador on May 2 that the GOL wanted to develop US-Libyan relations further through increased bilateral visits and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including Darfur and al-Qaeda. Kusa proposed that Muammar al-Qadhafi and POTUS meet in Italy during the G-8. The Ambassador reaffirmed the US interest in improving relations with Libya, and said he would convey the G-8 meeting request to Washington. The Ambassador urged Kusa to support the US proposal to construct an Embassy in Tripoli. In a subsequent one-on-one meeting, the Ambassador pressed for the release of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi, noting that the issue was of paramount importance to the United States. Kusa did not/not raise the issue of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbassit al-Megrahi or the GOL's anticipated request for his return to Libya under the recently ratified Libyan-UK Prisoner Transfer Agreement. End summary.

2.(C) FM Musa Kusa convoked the Ambassador on May 2 for their first meeting since Kusa was appointed Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in March (Foreign Minister-equivalent). Ambassador was accompanied by DCM; MFA Americas Desk Director Mohamed Matari and a notetaker were also present. Kusa began by noting the positive direction of US-Libyan relations and saying that the GOL wanted to develop the bilateral relationship further through high-level visits, including by congressional delegations. Such visits would help introduce key Americans to Libya and were essential, as Libya lacked an effective lobby in Washington.

Sudan-Chad Reconciliation Key to Solving Darfur

3.(C) Turning to specific areas of potential cooperation, Kusa, who had recently returned from Darfur-related meetings in Doha, outlined Libyan policy with respect to Darfur. In the GOL's view, achieving reconciliation between Sudan and Chad was the key to solving the Darfur conflict. Libya was working closely with the Qataris on this. Kusa said he had had good meetings in Doha with SE Gration, and supported the US efforts to achieve a Darfur ceasefire, although this would be difficult to achieve without "calming" tensions between Sudan and Chad. Those two governments continued to level accusations against each other, and it was difficult for outsiders to judge their accuracy. In the GOL's view, further agreements between Chad and Sudan were of no use; the focus should be on establishing a third-party border monitoring mechanism, similar to the one that Libya had previously participated in. Neutral third-party monitors would be in a position to judge, for example, whether JEM's Khalil Ibrahim was receiving weapons from Chad. (Kusa said he had met with a number of Darfur faction leaders while in Doha, but only JEM's Khalil Ibrahim had strength and influence, thanks to Ibrahim's tribal, political and personal connections in Sudan.) Kusa said that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally supported the border monitoring initiative and that he, Kusa, had requested US support through SE Gration. Asked by the Ambassador what type of support Libya sought, Kusa said the GOL sought US partnership in this effort, and would convey more specific requests later.

Al-Qaeda Expanding in Africa

4.(C) Another priority issue for US-Libyan engagement, Kusa said, was combating al-Qaeda in the Saharan and Maghreb regions. While the US focused on the Taliban, al-Qaeda was expanding its influence in the Saharan belt and north Africa. There had been 8 kidnappings in the past six months, including the two Canadian officials who were recently released in return for a ransom payment. Such payments were unfortunate and only increased the strength of al-Qaeda, he said. While many governments talked about cooperating with Libya in combating terrorists in the region, only the US was seriously engaged. He said he hoped bilateral cooperation would increase, to which the Ambassador responded urging the GOL to participate in the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative, noting that it would increase opportunities for Libyan engagement with the United States in this area. It would also be useful for the GOL to invite General Ward, head of the US Africa Command, to return to Libya for a visit (that invitation has now been conveyed).

Qadhafi and POTUS in Italy?

5.(C) The US and Libya should also confer on the policies of "other governments" that are trying to "influence events on the [African] continent," Kusa continued (in a possible reference to China). The upcoming G-8 summit in Italy would be an appropriate venue for "high-level discussions" between Libya and the US on these subjects. Kusa said he was personally committed to improving relations between our two governments. Noting the importance in Libyan culture of personal relationships to building trust, Kusa said he hoped the State Department could TRIPOLI 00000362 002.2 OF 002 arrange a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and President Obama at the summit. The Ambassador said the US was committed to improving the relationship, as Libyan National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi had heard from several senior USG officials during his recent visit in Washington, and that he would convey the request to Washington. As a concrete symbol of Libyan commitment to the relationship, the Ambassador urged Kusa to support the US proposal to purchase land to build a new Embassy, reminding him that the Secretary had personally made this request to Mutassim al-Qadhafi, and assuring him that the Embassy's design would take into account the Libyan environment and culture.

Human Rights: Al-Jahmi

6.(C) In a subsequent one-one-one meeting, the Ambassador pressed Kusa for the release of detained regime critic Fathi al-Jahmi, either to his home or abroad, emphasizing that the issue continued to be of great concern to the United States. Noting al-Jahmi's apparently deteriorating physical condition which made action all the more critical, the Ambassador said that in his view, al-Jahmi's death in custody could lead to a setback in the bilateral relationship. Kusa said it was unfortunate that the USG had publicized the issue during Mutassim al-Qadhafi's visit, and that such publicity only caused the Leader to become more inflexible. The Ambassador told Kusa to focus on the fact that the White House did not publicize the raising of the issue by NSA Jones with Mutassim and that USG officials, in raising the issue several times during the past several weeks in Tripoli and Washington, had made every effort to keep discussions regarding al-Jahmi's release private. Kusa said he understood the importance of the issue to the US, said he would "do his best," and suggested that al-Jahmi might be released after a meeting between the Leader and POTUS. The Ambassador strongly reiterated that the GOL should not wait any longer to release al-Jahmi, given the precarious condition of his health.

Comment

7.(C) Comment: Kusa is one of the most influential figures in the regime, and has been a proponent of improved ties with the United States. In his previous role as head of Libya's External Intelligence Organization, he was a key member of the Libyan team that negotiated the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States and Europe (including the leadership's decisions to renounce terrorism and relinquish WMD), and he subsequently supported robust bilateral cooperation in combating al-Qaeda and stemming the flow of foreign fighters heading to Iraq. In his new role as foreign minister, he apparently will continue to advocate for strengthening relations with the US, focusing on areas of clear mutual interest such as Darfur and al-Qaeda. Securing a meeting for Muammar al-Qadhafi with the President is probably at the top of his list, given the importance al-Qadhafi places on such encounters. Interestingly, Kusa did not/not raise the matter of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbassit al-Megrahi or the GOL's anticipated request that he be returned to Libya under the recently-ratified Prisoner Transfer Agreement with the UK. End comment. CRETZ