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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI363, SLA/U CAN NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH ASSURANCES THAT JEM AND KHARTOUM WILL ALSO LAY DOWN ARMS REF: A. TRIPOLI 249 B. KHARTOUM 583 C. DOHA 283 D. TRIPOLI 362 TRIPOLI 00000363 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI363 2009-05-03 15:03 2011-01-31 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO5051
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0363/01 1231558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 031558Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4780
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0167
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0027
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1049
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0733
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5310
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NDJAMENA PLEASE PASS TO SE GRATION, DEPT FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/3/2019 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO SU CD LY
SUBJECT: SLA/U CAN NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH ASSURANCES THAT JEM AND KHARTOUM WILL ALSO LAY DOWN ARMS REF: A. TRIPOLI 249 B. KHARTOUM 583 C. DOHA 283 D. TRIPOLI 362 TRIPOLI 00000363 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: Sudan Liberation Army Unity Faction (SLA/U) representatives back from Doha are keen to know how the USG regards rival factions - particularly Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - as they re-evaluate their strategy after a month of setbacks. With the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" unification process quickly disbanded due to defections to the JEM, rebel leaders are casting Suliman Jamous' switch as a positive - claiming that "Khalil's best spy" was now exposed and Abdullah Yehia once again had the undisputed leadership of SLA/U. Unity representatives said they are willing to talk peace, but cautioned that if JEM continued attacking Yehia's positions as they did on April 27, SLA/U would be forced to counterattack JEM's positions in Um Jalis, Chad. The rebel leaders are eager to discern the diplomatic states of play - both in the Libya/Chad/Sudan tri-lateral talks and the U.S. role in Doha-based mediation - before committing to the peace process. End summary.

CHAD'S SUPPORT FOR JEM AND RECENT DEFECTIONS CAUSE ANXIETY

2.(C) In a May 3 meeting with Poloff, SLA/U representatives Sayyid Sharif and Mahgoub Hussein said they could accept further negotiations toward a cease fire in Doha only with assurances that all parties brought to the table would be held to the same standard. Sharif and Hussein were particularly concerned that they were being boxed in "from every direction" - citing Sudan's support of the Janjaweed militias and calling JEM's Khalil Ibrahim "the Chadian Minister of Defense." Both representatives agreed that the April 27-29 meetings in Doha were positive steps, but that attacks carried out against SLA/U positions by JEM-affiliated fighters on April 27 complicated an inclusive ceasefire between the SLA and both the GOS and other rebel factions.

3.(C) Hussein confirmed JEM's April 3 announcement that former SLA High Command member Suliman Jamous had joined up with Khalil Ibrahim but claimed Jamous took with him only 15-20 "family members" and four trucks. SLA/U representatives here have frequently complained about Jamous' attempts to cloud the leadership issue, asserting that Abdullah Yehia had a mandate from civil society. Hussein noted that Jamous and Ibrahim have a long-standing relationship. He claimed that Jamous had been accepting cash from Ibrahim since the former's release from prison and that his leaving JEM would benefit SLA/U in the long run as JEM had lost "Khalil's best spy". Despite earlier comments that the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" had made them significantly stronger (ref A), Hussein discounted the defections of Jamous and the SLA/Juba faction as minor and "personal" - noting that while high-profile members had switched their fighters had stayed with Yehia..

JEM IS TRYING TO DESTROY YEHIA TO BECOME NEW RULER OF SUDAN

4.(C) The SLA/U officials also confirmed that JEM had attacked SLA/U positions an Um Rai (ref B) with "53 trucks and several hundred fighters," which were repelled by an SLA/U force consisting of just six trucks. Abdallah Yehia was at Um Rai and participated in the five-hour battle, in which nine SLA/U fighters were wounded and JEM lost six killed in action. While SLA/U still sees political solutions and peace talks in Doha as possibly productive, both warned that if JEM attacked SLA/U again, they would have no option but to attack his base camp at Um Jalis, Chad. Hussein encouraged the USG to rebuke JEM for its continued fighting and for Ibrahim's attempts to become the "new Turabi of Sudan".

SLA/U CLAIMS TO BE ONLY GROUP WITHOUT SPONSOR

5.(C) Holding out Chadian support for JEM and Sudanese support for janjaweed militias, Sharif claimed that SLA/U was the only rebel faction not participating in the proxy war between Chad and Sudan. According to Sharif, JEM receives, "guns, ammunition, petrol, everything" from its sponsors in N'Djamena. When asked where SLA/U got their supplies, he said their fighters capture enough of what they need as the spoils of battle. He was eager to hear if we knew the outcome of Libya's ongoing efforts to reconcile Chad and Sudan and stand up a peacekeeping force on the border. Hussein expected to meet with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa on May 4 or 5, and said that SLA/U had not yet received an invitation for follow-on talks in Doha planned for the same timeframe. TRIPOLI 00000363 002.2 OF 002

6.(C) Comment: After a month of setbacks, both representatives sought explicit statements of USG support - calling immediately after returning to Tripoli on April 30 to set up the meeting. They seemed somewhat unconvinced of their own spin about the unimportance of Jamous' defection and the disintegration of the March 15 unity talks in Tripoli - which they had previously told us was a substantial increase in their military strength. Their advice-seeking seems genuine; it appears as though they are approaching talks in Doha as a question of survival of their movement in the face of JEM's ascendancy and renewed attacks on their leadership. Encouraging them to burnish their democratic and diplomatic credentials and desire to develop Darfur to serve its people by participating in Doha talks in good faith will succeed only if they feel that Chad, Sudan, and the JEM will be held to the same standard. End comment. CRETZ