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Viewing cable 09HAVANA341, FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HAVANA341 2009-06-09 19:07 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0341/01 1601953
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091953Z JUN 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4471
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0138
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/NAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000341 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029 
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO 
US-CU MIGRATION TALKS 

REF: (A) HAVANA 172 (B) HAVANA 187 

Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

1. (S//NF) Summary: On 5 June, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Drug 
Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the United States 
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a 
repatriation of sixteen Cuban migrants at Bahia de Cabanas. 
During the transit to and from the pier, a Cuban Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official offered subtle insights on 
the possible GOC approach to the upcoming migration talks 
between the USG and GOC, and reiterated past statements 
regarding issues that he believes are of mutual concern 
between both nations. The conversation occurred immediately 
following 2 incidents involving the commandeering of a Cuban 
Border Guard (CBG) go-fast (gf) by 2 CBG recruits, and the 
appearance of 7 migrants in a raft in front of the USINT 
building. End Summary. 

2. (S//NF) The 5 June repatriation was the second in a 
week, with the first taking place on 30 May. Armando Bencomo 
(Bencomo), the MINREX official in attendance, was 
uncharacteristically quiet on 30 May, choosing not to 
initiate conversation regarding policy issues as he normally 
does. On 30 May, DIS mentioned to Bencomo the prospect for 
re-initiation of migrant talks, to which Bencomo responded 
that his government was mulling over the offer. Bencomo, in 
typical fashion, made a point to reiterate that the former 
Bush administration had quashed the talks in 2004, and stated 
that the talks had previously been one of the only forms of 
productive candor between both parties. 

3. (S//NF) Conversely, on 5 June, immediately upon 
embarking on the short gf trip to the migrant receiving pier 
at Cabanas, the conversation between DIS and Bencomo turned 
to the subject of the migration talks. However, the topic 
was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message 
that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3 
additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural 
disaster response and preparation. These 3 items are common 
themes in conversations with Bencomo, and DIS believes, based 
on his repeated statements, and their recent offer to include 
these three topics as a way ahead between both sides, that 
the GOC's interest in these three items may be greater than 
migration-related issues. 

4. (S//NF) Immediately following the repatriation, DIS and 
Bencomo boarded the gf for the ten minute trip back to the 
parking lot in the town of Cabanas. While boarding, in 
nonchalant fashion, Bencomo asked about the status of 2 CBG 
recruits who commandeered a CBG gf on the evening of 31 May. 
The 2 were ultimately rescued by the USCG when the gf they 
commandeered was located broken down fifty nautical miles 
northwest of Cuba. DIS informed Bencomo that the 2 were 
being treated per normal migrant processing protocols, and at 
the time of the conversation, disposition had not been 
determined- the issue was dropped immediately thereafter. 

5. (S//NF) A more detailed conversation regarding the 
migrant talks ensued during the gf ride back to the parking 
area at Cabanas. Adding the disclaimer "in my opinion," 
Bencomo said he thought the talks will be a positive thing. 
DIS asked why, and Bencomo continued that the venue would be 
a good opportunity to discuss why Cubans choose to leave 
Cuba; specifically, Bencomo stated he believes the talks will 
help identify which factors motivate Cubans to depart the 
island to pursue a life in the United States. Bencomo, 
without naming the policy, alluded to the "wet-foot, 
dry-foot" policy currently in place that permits Cubans who 
reach U.S. soil to remain there legally; Bencomo expressed 
rather subtly his disapproval of this policy. Further, he 
asserted that the talks would be a good venue where both 
sides might develop or agree to joint measures that would 

help curtail a mass migration scenario from Cuba. In 
addition, he stated that the talks would help both sides to 
develop a response to a potential mass migration scenario. 
Finally, Bencomo alluded to the Cuban mass migration events 
in 1980 and 1994, and stated that in 1994 the U.S. encouraged 
the behavior of Cubans who chose to steal boats and depart 
the island by not returning those boats or treating said 
Cubans as criminals. 

6. (S//NF) Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he 
stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures 
towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take 
"heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS 
asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other 
three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was 
so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that 
the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching 
point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we 
believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five 
Cuban spies. Bencomo summed up the Cuban outlook on the 
current USG-GOC relationship when he stated that "everything 
is in your (U.S.) hands." Note: This is a consistent theme 
heard from all of the DIS's Cuban contacts; GOC 
representatives persistently reiterate in their dialogue that 
the status of the USG-GOC is the fault of the U.S., and the 
road ahead lies entirely in the hands of the U.S. This line 
of conversation is usually accompanied by an unsolicited 
statement by the representatives that eschews the notion of 
human rights and pre-conditions asserted by the U.S. in any 
dealings with the GOC; both of these issues are so far beyond 
the consideration of GOC officials that merely mentioning 
them normally turns off a conversation in its entirety. 

7. (S//NF) Summary: DIS assesses that the GOC will attempt 
to place the wet-foot, dry-foot issue at the center of the 
upcoming migrant talks, and perhaps hammer the policy as the 
prime reason for illicit Cuban migration departures from 
Cuba. The mention of a mass migration scenario by a Cuban 
official, especially one at the relatively high level that 
Bencomo currently holds, is unusual. 

8. (S//NF) Further Summary: While the DIS has significant, 
regular contact during repatriations with Bencomo, DIS also 
has significant contact with Ministry of Interior (MININT) 
officials while carrying out counternarcotic and 
countermigration duties. As such, DIS has and continues to 
gather unique insight into the demeanor and consistent party 
line of these elements of the GOC. GOC officials tend to tow 
the same line; however, DIS has noticed a recent up-tick in 
anti-U.S. policy candor from the various GOC officials. DIS 
estimates this is a sign that Cuban officials are 
uncomfortable with the shifting U.S. approach to dealing with 
Cuba demonstrated in recent months. In short, GOC is 
developing a defensive posture, and is utilizing their 
relationship with the DIS as one of an interlocutor to 
verbally state their interest in discussing issues of mutual 
cooperation; however, their actions, or lack thereof in some 
cases, suggest otherwise. For instance, in the aftermath of 
a large drug bust facilitated by US-Cuban-Bahamian 
information exchange, wherein the CBG recovered a large 
amount of marijuana and 3 traffickers, the Cuban 
representative from the Anti Drug Directorate utilized a 
follow-up meeting with the DIS to chastise U.S. authorities 
in the U.S. for not detecting trace amounts of marijuana 
concealed in ink markers and carried onto the island by Cuban 
American visitors. The GOC mentality that they are never in 
the wrong, and the U.S. has fostered the current poor state 
of relations between the two states, is more prevalent now 
than in the past year the DIS has spent on the island. End 
Summary. 
FARRAR