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Viewing cable 09SOFIA325, BULGARIA/EC MONITORING TEAM: "HOW DO YOU MAKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SOFIA325 2009-06-26 15:03 2010-12-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Sofia
VZCZCXRO9986
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0325/01 1771543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261543Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6109
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0264
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000325 

SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA/EC MONITORING TEAM: "HOW DO YOU MAKE 
THEM REFORM WHEN THEY DON'T WANT TO?" 

REF: A. SOFIA 0225 
B. 08 SOFIA 0365 
C. 08 SOFIA 0499 

Classified By: DCM Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: XXXXXXXXXXXX (please strictly protect) confided that 
the July report on Bulgaria's anti-crime and corruption 
efforts would be negative, but the EU political level would 
"water down" the tone of the final version. The report's 
release might be delayed until September because of the 
formation of a new Commission. In contrast to previous 
conversations, XXXXXXXXXXXX emotionally reflected Brussels, 
growing and by now extreme frustration with Sofia's cosmetic 
fixes to get a "good report" while failing to undertake real 
reforms. He confirmed that the Dutch want to invoke the 
safeguard clause when the report is released and that others, 
including the Swedes who hold the next presidency, favor 
extending the Mechanism beyond its three-year mandate. END 
SUMMARY. 


2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

------------------------------------------ 
Judicial Reform -- Fatigue and Frustration 
------------------------------------------ 

3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the monitors raised key issues with 
the GOB such as the appointment procedure for top judicial 
officials, vote buying, and progress in organized crime and 
high-level corruption cases. XXXXXXXXXXXX called the 
appointment/nomination procedure for the top judicial 
officials "non-transparent" because the vote on the nominees 
is secret and does not take into full account disciplinary 
actions against the nominees. Furthermore, the process lacks 
real debate among the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) members 
on the nominees' qualifications and does not allow the 
members to release "opinions" on why they voted for or 
against a nominee. The non-transparent procedure permits the 
selection of corrupt and/or incompetent judges and 
prosecutors to the higher courts, perpetuating the cycle of 
incompetence and corruption in the Bulgarian judiciary. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX said the entire team believes the Bulgarians only 
address issues in the Commission's report to get a "good 
report," not to create a better judicial system. For 
example, Prosecutor General Boris Velchev asked if his 
nomination of a certain person for a position in the 
prosecutor's office would be recorded negatively in the 
upcoming Commission report. They replied to Velchev that if 
he thinks the nomination would be reported negatively, then 
it is a "good sign that it probably would be." XXXXXXXXXXXX 
added that Velchev often asks how he is perceived in Brussels 
when they discuss reforms in the prosecution service. 
Another example is that Sofia City Court has two courtrooms 
specifically available for hearing EU funds fraud cases, 
while available courtrooms for other cases are hard to come 
by. 

4. (C) The Bulgarian government -- especially PG Velchev 
and European Minister Passy -- are lobbying heavily for a 
positive monitoring report, magnifying modest progress. The 
government keeps presenting the Commission a list of on-going 
high profile organized crime and corruption court cases (the 
number has grown from 30 to 52 over the last two and a half 
years) as "successes." Incredibly, several of the "success" 
cases have been suspended. Several other cases, against 
notorious shady businessmen Angel Khristov and Plamen Galev 
AKA the Galevi brothers, and others can hardly be called 

SOFIA 00000325 002 OF 002 


successes as these defendants gained immunity by running for 
parliament. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the team found this "loophole" 
quite disturbing, along with how some Bulgarian officials 
vehemently defend the law that permits this phenomenon. 
Along with the "Galevization" of politics (referring to the 
Galevi brothers election campaign), Brussels is also 
concerned with vote buying and general election fraud. 


------------------------ 
Only Sticks Seem to Work 
------------------------ 

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the Commission feels they have 
"tried everything" to make the Bulgarians reform their 
judicial system, but concluded "how do you make them reform 
when they do not want to?" The government's defensive 
arrogance -- and lack of political will -- is intensifying 
enlargement fatigue in Brussels. He underscored that EC 
pressure via the monitoring reports and withholding EU funds 
are the only ways to produce results. He confirmed media 
reports that Dutch Minister of European Affairs Franz 
Timmermans requested the Commission to consider activating 
the safeguard clause against Bulgaria and Romania when the EC 
releases both reports. (Activating the safeguard clause in 
Justice and Home Affairs would mean that the European Union 
would not recognize Bulgaria's legal decisions and exclude 
Bulgaria from legal and police cooperation.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
currently only The Netherlands is demanding the safeguard 
clause, but others are increasingly fed-up with Bulgaria (and 
Romania's) lack of progress. There is talk within the 
Commission about extending the Monitoring and Verification 
Mechanism beyond the three years stated in Bulgaria's and 
Romania's EU Accession Acquis. Sweden, which holds the next 
EU presidency, favors extending the monitoring mechanism and 
is committed to pursue "rule of law issues" in both countries. 

6. (C) The report's release date hinges on EU internal 
political maneuvering for the formation and nomination of 
the new Commission and the election of its next president -- 
a process that begins in July. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the 
team is preparing the report to be released the last week of 
July, but it may be published the second half of September if 
the new Commission formation is drawn out. The team's report 
will be critical, saying overall reform has stopped, but 
likely the final EC report will be "watered down" as in the 
past for political reasons. 

7. (C) COMMENT: XXXXXXXXXXXX's frustration with the Bulgarian 
government's lame and insincere reform efforts was striking. 
It appears to be spreading in Brussels where at least the 
working level appears to be feeling "buyers remorse" over 
letting Bulgaria and Romania into the club too early. 
According to reliable contacts, Brussels Eurocrats have 
dubbed enlargement fatigue the "Bulgarian Break," further 
tarnishing Bulgaria's bad image within the EU (REFTEL A). 
END COMMENT. 
McEldowney