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Viewing cable 09BUJUMBURA302, NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: STATE 030541 Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BUJUMBURA302 2009-07-02 12:12 2011-02-01 21:09 SECRET Embassy Bujumbura
VZCZCXYZ0000
ZZ RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJB #0302/01 1831228
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
Z 021228Z JUL 09 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1579
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0077
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0143
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0161
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT; LONDON, PARIS, PLEASE 
PASS TO AFRICA WATCHERS, ADDIS PLEASE PASS TO AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019 
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: STATE 030541 Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b) (d).

1.(SBU) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. The report was generated by the Defense Attach (DATT) after a meeting with host government intelligence officials, who brought the suspect material into the room. Information concerning this report was initially relayed to PMAT by telephone at 1035Z, and further information was transmitted by email at 1151Z.

2.(S/NF) Details of the incident follow:

--------------- Location and Description of Material ---------------

A) The material is currently stationary, in storage at the Burundian Intelligence Service headquarters in Kigobe, Bujumbura. B) The material is suspected by the Burundian officials to be uranium; accompanying documents reference "U-A238." C) No procedures have been used to identify the material. D) The material is in a six-inch diameter, two-foot long metal container with an orange/red domed top and an apparently locally-produced woven fiber carrier with handle. E) The amount of material is unknown. F) Photos of the item were taken and should be available several hours after transmission of this cable. G) The material is stationary. H) The material is stationary. I) There is no manifest; there are accompanying photocopied documents which purport to be test results claiming the material is in fact radioactive. Scans of these documents were forwarded to PMAT via classified email. J) The material's origins are unknown; the host government claims to have obtained the materials from a local citizen, who reportedly claims to have obtained it from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The accompanying documents purport to be from Uganda and Zaire (DRC).

---------------- Alarm and Detection Details ----------------

K) The report originates from the DATT, who encountered the material in a meeting with the Burundian intelligence services. L) The DATT encountered the material at approximately 0830Z (1030 local time) on 2 July 2009. M) There was no radiation alarm, and no other technical inspection of the material has taken place. N) No spectral file is available. O) Only the material, the woven fiber carrier and the documentation were purportedly smuggled. P) The DATT encountered the material at the Burundian intelligence service headquarters in Kigobe in the office of Chief of Cabinet of the Internal Intelligence Service (SNR), Agricole Ntirampeba. Q) No radiation detector was used, and none are available to Post.

--------------- Host Government Response ---------------

R) The Burundian intelligence services have custody of the material. S) The material is locked in an unoccupied office on the top floor of the Intelligence Service headquarters. T) The Intelligence Service is willing to keep the material locked in the office. Although this is not a particularly secure location, it is likely one of the more secure locations available, and is in a new, well-constructed building. U) The host government has not expressed its plans or desires for disposition of the material; it has merely requested assistance in verifying whether it is, in fact, radioactive. V) Post does not know who else might know about the material. W) The material was not seized on the border to Post's knowledge, and Post does not know whether the government of the DRC knows about it. X) Post does not know whether the IAEA has been alerted to the material's presence. Y) There is no investigation at present, but the Burundian Intelligence Service, through its Chief of Cabinet, has requested U.S. assistance in determining whether the material is in fact radioactive. Post has received no official request at this time. Z) No criminal charges have been involved to Post's knowledge.

-------------- Details on the individuals involved --------------

AA) Individuals involved: -- LtCol Thomas Miller USAF, xxxxxxxxxxxx; -- Gilbert Bulanje, Director of External Intelligence; -- Telesphore Bigirimana, Director of Communication Intelligence Services; -- Agricole Ntirampeba, Chief of Cabinet of the Internal Intelligence Service. BB) The intelligence services claim that they obtained the material from an unnamed local businessman who had attempted to sell it to them. The government intends to pay him for the material should it prove radioactive. CC) The seller did not claim access to additional material. DD) The Intelligence Service obviously has a relationship with the source of the material based on its possession of the material, but Post is not aware whether the seller is an established contact or source.

3.(SBU) Action officer at Post for handling incident is acting RSO Michael S. Diamond, at xxxxxxxxxxxx, cell xxxxxxxxxxxx, or xxxxxxxxxxxx. 
Wagner