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Viewing cable 09MEXICO2882, ELEMENTS OF GOM POLICY TEAM INTERESTED IN FOCUSING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MEXICO2882 2009-10-05 20:08 2010-12-02 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Mexico
INFO  LOG-00   AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  CPR-00   INL-00   DODE-00  
      DOEE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    OIGO-00  FBIE-00  VCI-00   H-00     
      TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   L-00     MOFM-00  MOF-00   VCIE-00  
      DCP-00   NSAE-00  ISN-00   OMB-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    
      PRS-00   P-00     ISNE-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    
      NCTC-00  ASDS-00  IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00  PESU-00  SANA-00  
        /001W
   
O 052026Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8484
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
HQ USNORTHCOM  PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
US MARSHALS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002882 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019 
TAGS: KCRM PGOV SNAR MX
SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF GOM POLICY TEAM INTERESTED IN FOCUSING 
TOGETHER ON IMPROVING SECURITY IN A FEW KEY CITIES 

Classified By: NAS Director Keith Mines, reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 


1. (C) Summary: At a dinner hosted by PGR for a visiting DOJ 
delegation, National Security Coordinator Tello Peon and 
Undersecretary for Governance Gutierrez Fernandez told the 
delegation they would like to explore seriously focusing our 
joint efforts on two or three key cities to reverse the 
current wave of violence and instability and show success in 
the fight against the DTOs in the next 18 months. They 
suggested starting in Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and one other 
city with a joint planning cell to review what resources we 
could collectively bring to bear. They believe the symbolism 
of turning several of the most violent cities would be 
potent, sending a signal to the rest of the country that the 
fight against organized crime can be won, and combating the 
current sense of impotence felt by many Mexicans. They 
believe it would also go a long way toward stitching up the 
country,s damaged international reputation. End Summary. 

2. (U) Acting Attorney General Alcantara hosted a dinner for 
Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division Lanny 
Breuer September 21 in Mexico City. Other attendees 
included: 

GOM 
National Security System Coordinator Jorge Tello Peon 
Undersecretary for Governance (SEGOB) Geronimo Gutierrez 
Fernandez 
PGR DAG (SIEDO) Marisela Morales 
PGR DAG Victor Emilio Corzo Cabanas 
PGR Director for Analysis and Strategic Information Oscar 
Rocha Dobrowski 

US 
Deputy Assistant AG Bruce Swartz 
Deputy Assistant AG for Criminal Division Kenneth Blanco 
Special Assistant to the AG Paul Rosen 
DOJ Attache Tony Garcia 
NAS Director Keith Mines 

GOM WANTS FULL TRANSFER OF INTEL TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 

3. (C) Alcantara opened the meeting with two requests from 
Oscar Rocha. First, he said PGR would like to develop a more 
general exchange of intelligence information and capacity, 
not the case-by-case exchange we now have. Second, they 
would like for us to provide a full exchange of technology 
for use in intelligence gathering, not just the loan of 
equipment for specific cases, but the transfer of the 
know-how and training as well. Morales added that the FBI is 
helping to create a cyber-unit in Mexico but it would be 
beneficial if it were expanded and replicated more broadly. 
The SSP, she said, already has a cyber-unit but the real 
mandate rests with PGR-SIEDO. The U.S. side offered that 
there is great capacity in CCIPS in the Criminal Division and 
they would be happy to find ways to offer training and 
capacity building to their Mexican counterparts. We would be 
pleased, Breuer said, in the effort to press High Value 
Targets, to get our Mexican counterparts to the point where 
they can do these things themselves. It will take the 
development of strong trust through proper vetting and good 
training but it would be excellent to get to the point where 
there is no longer impunity for a Chapo Guzman because his 
operating space has been eliminated. 

4. (C) Rocha then spoke of the technological leap about to 
take place in the coming years in the intelligence field. He 
cited the target-finding equipment used by the USMS with 
Mexican counterparts but asked if it would be possible to 
acquire not only such equipment for GOM officials, but also 
the training and full technology transfer that would go with 
it. He suggested we work with vetted units first to provide 
such equipment and training, and then move it out more 
broadly, both to PGR and CISEN. The U.S. side suggested 
getting together in the appropriate working group to see what 
could be done. Rocha reiterated that his intent would be to 
develop indigenous to the PGR all the capacity they currently 
have only in conjunction with the USMS. 

STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS IN MERIDA 
----------------------------------- 

5. (C) Gutierrez Fernandez then turned to the Merida 
Initiative, saying that in retrospect he and other GOM 
officials realize that not enough strategic thought went into 
Merida in the early phase. There was too much emphasis in 
the initial planning on equipment, which they now know is 
slow to arrive and even slower to be of direct utility in the 
fight against the DTOs. Of more immediate importance is 
building institutions that can effectively use the equipment. 
He was careful to point out that all the equipment is needed 
and will be put to good use, but wishes that there had been a 
more direct focus on institution building, and supported the 
current shift in Merida focus to capacity building and 
creating more effective institutions. 

"WE HAVE EIGHTEEN MONTHS" 
------------------------- 

6. (C) Gutierrez went on to say, however, that he now 
realizes there is not even time for the institution building 
to take hold in the remaining years of the Calderon 
administration. "We have 18 months," he said, "and if we 
do not produce a tangible success that is recognizable to the 
Mexican people, it will be difficult to sustain the 
confrontation into the next administration." He lamented 
the pervasive, debilitating fear that is so much a part of 
contemporary Mexican society, where even people in the 
Yucatan, with "European levels of security" are afraid 
because of the instability in a few distant cities. He 
expressed a real concern with "losing" certain regions. It 
is damaging Mexico's international reputation, hurting 
foreign investment, and leading to a sense of government 
impotence, Gutierrez said. 

DON,T SHY AWAY FROM THE HARDEST CHALLENGES 
------------------------------------------ 

7. (C) Gutierrez believes what is needed is a clear roadmap 
for the remaining years of security cooperation between the 
U.S. and Mexico under President Calderon that targets a few 
joint projects in a few cities, rather than doing a little of 
everything. Tello Peon agreed, suggesting that there is not 
time for pilot projects, and certainly not time to work in a 
few relatively safe cities such as Nuevo Laredo as has been 
suggested, in order to develop the experience to take on the 
real challenges. 

8. (C) Instead, he believes, we need to confront the cities 
with the largest insecurity and fix them. If we could turn 
around Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and one other city such as 
Culiacan, it would solve 60% of the violence, and send a 
signal to the Mexican people that the war can be won. 
Politically, he and Gutierrez said, Mexico must succeed in 
Juarez because Calderon has staked so much of his reputation 
there, with a major show of force that, to date, has not 
panned out. Even if it is not completely solved by the time 
Calderon leaves office, if they can get things moving in the 
right direction, setting the conditions for ultimate success, 
it will be enough. There was a brief &chicken and egg8 
discussion, with one side suggesting that well-placed and 
effective federal forces could push back the DTOs 
sufficiently for the state and local forces to function, 
while others believed that well-functioning state and local 
forces will be a precondition for the federal forces to 
produce stability. 

MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER 
----------------------- 

9. (C) Gutierrez thought that to start we need a good joint 
assessment of organized criminal groups that makes explicit 
their vulnerabilities. We have, he said, five things to put 
into the fight: resources, training, joint operations, 
technology, and cooperation, and we need to mobilize 
effectively all of them. He especially mentioned the need to 
synchronize our joint efforts, citing the recent show of 
force the U.S. promised on our side of the border that could 
not be matched by anything on the Mexican side, leaving it 
hollow. Tello Peon suggested we form a planning cell, a few 
experts on each side, who could focus on a few programs in a 
few places for the next 2 years. 

10. (C) In addition to the intelligence and operational 
cooperation that would be at the heart of the new approach, 
Gutierrez and Tello Peon mentioned the importance of cultural 
and political factors. Politically, Mexico may have a 
federal system, Gutierrez said, but historically it has been 
more centralized like Colombia or France. The federal 
government, however, no longer has the ability to manage the 
system from top to bottom. He suggested it would be 
necessary for success to break through the impasse produced 
by Mexico,s currently dysfunctional federal system and 
ensure programs can be synchronized with the states. Tello 
Peon also said there will be a need to work on the cultural 
factors required to produce a &culture of lawfulness8 that 
would mobilize the societal support necessary for success. 
Culture and politics will be very complex, he said, but can 
be made to work. A clearly articulated and strong doctrine 
will help get people behind the strategy. 

11. (C) Tello Peon ended the discussion by saying he arrived 
at the dinner somewhat fatigued but would leave energized. 
He thought it was an excellent mix of people and welcomed the 
honest exchange of new ideas. Mexico, he summarized, is 
committed to staying the course, which is sustainable with a 
few clear successes. 

12. (C) Comment: We will follow up with Tello Peon and 
Gutierrez in the coming weeks to see how committed the GOM is 
to the strategy of selecting a few key cities and working to 
turn security. If it is their strategy and they plan to 
execute it, we should get behind it, using the new strategic 
framework to build a regional program to take on the biggest 
challenges in key border cities. A considerable amount could 
be done with existing funding and a marginal increase in 
staffing. We would use the remainder of the calendar year 
for planning, and have a new series of programs ready to roll 
out in the new year. 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 

PASCUAL