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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000416 

SIPDIS 

NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER,S PARTY 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2030 
TAGS: PHUM SNAR ASEC MX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S FEBRUARY 24 
VISIT 

Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein, Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d) 

¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your 
February 24 visit to Pakistan. You will participate in a 
trilateral cooperation meeting with Pakistani Interior 
Minister Rehman Malik and Afghan Interior Minister Hanif 
Atmar, followed by bilateral meetings with senior Pakistani 
officials, including Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) 
Director General Zafarullah Khan, Intelligence Bureau (IB) 
Director General Javed Noor, and Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) Director General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. 

¶2. (C) You should express to your Pakistani interlocutors 
appreciation for ongoing law enforcement cooperation and 
express our readiness to enhance such efforts. You may want 
to register U.S. concerns about terrorist threats to U.S. 
citizens and U.S. interests that emanate from Pakistan, and 
encourage continued Pakistani action to counter these 
threats. You should press the Pakistanis to follow through 
on their prosecution of the seven Mumbai defendants. End 
Summary. 

Domestic Overview 
------------------ 

¶3. (C) Pakistan continues to face extraordinary challenges on 
the security and law enforcement front. The country has 
suffered greater military, law enforcement, and civilian 
casualties in fighting extremism and terrorism than almost 
any other country. Pakistan's military is currently engaged 
in combat operations against militant groups in the Malakand 
Division of North West Frontier Province (NFWP) and six of 
the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border. At the same time, 
Pakistan has experienced an alarming increase in terrorist 
attacks against government and civilian targets in Pakistan's 
major cities, resulting in several hundred deaths in recent 
months. In your meetings, you should acknowledge the 
sacrifices made by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies and 
the pressure the terrorist attacks have placed on their 
resources. 

¶4. (C) In the midst of this difficult security situation, 
Pakistan's civilian government remains weak, ineffectual, and 
corrupt. Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about 
the fate of President Zardari. He enjoys approval ratings in 
the 20 percent range and has repeatedly clashed with key 
power centers, including the military, politically ambitious 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and opposition 
leader Nawaz Sharif. In December, the Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional the November 2007 National Reconciliation 
Ordinance, promulgated by then-President Musharraf, which 
provided legal amnesty for Benazir Bhutto, Zardari, and key 
figures in their party, enabling them to participate in 2008 
elections. The Court's ruling has paved the way for a 
revival of corruption cases against a number of officials, 
including Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Whether corruption 
cases can be revived against Zardari himself is less certain, 
as Pakistan's constitution includes a clause providing 
sitting presidents with criminal immunity. 

¶5. (C) While we have had major successes in our military and 
law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan, cooperation has 
frequently been hampered by suspicion in Pakistan's military 
and intelligence establishment about U.S. intentions and 
objectives. Among other things, the Pakistanis believe that 
we have favored India over Pakistan -- most notably, by 
approving civil-nuclear cooperation with India -- and that we 
aim to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which, 
in light of their conventional military disadvantage 
vis-a-vis India, they consider critical to their national 
security. The military and intelligence establishment is 
also concerned that we are working with Pakistan's civilian 
leadership to limit the military's prerogative in determining 
Pakistan's national security policies. As a result of these 
concerns, the military and intelligence establishment has 
taken steps since Spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the 

ISLAMABAD 00000416 002 OF 004 


Embassy. These steps include holding up the issuance and 
renewal of Pakistani visas for permanent Embassy staff and 
TDYers; denying import permits for armored vehicles for 
Embassy use; sabotaging our contract with DynCorp 
International to provide enhanced protective support for 
Consulate General Peshawar personnel; slowing down 
importation of U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government, 
including equipment for Pakistani law enforcement agencies; 
shutting down our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training 
program at Pakistan's Sihala Police Academy; putting up 
roadblocks for our acquiring additional land for the 
Embassy's expansion; and harassing Embassy personnel by 
stopping and detaining Embassy vehicles. Some of these 
problems have recently abated in response to our repeatedly 
raising them with the highest levels of the Pakistani 
government. However, we expect we will have to continue to 
push back against such impediments for the foreseeable future. 

Federal Investigation Agency 
---------------------------- 

¶6. (C) The FBI's primary Pakistani counterpart is the Federal 
Investigation Agency (FIA). On December 7, the government 
replaced FIA Director General Tariq Khosa with Zafarullah 
Khan. While Khosa was ostensibly given a promotion by being 
named Secretary of the Ministry of Narcotics Control, a 
number of press reports maintained that Khosa was removed 
from his FIA position for his aggressive pursuit of 
corruption cases against government officials and 
businessmen. Khosa had developed close cooperation with the 
U.S. on a host of law enforcement issues, including on the 
Mumbai case. While Khan has a strong law enforcement 
background, he has not shown an inclination to be as 
forward-leaning on cooperation as Khosa was. 

Counter-Terrorism Finance 
------------------------- 

¶7. (S) In the past year, Pakistan has made steady progress in 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
Earlier this year, the FIA partnered with the State Bank of 
Pakistan to crack down on large licensed and unlicensed money 
service businesses that were violating foreign exchange laws 
and contributing to money laundering. In January, the 
National Assembly passed new Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
legislation; the bill is currently awaiting Senate action. 
In the interim, the legislation is in force through its 
promulgation as an ordnance signed by President Zardari. 
Separately, during a February 12 meeting in Islamabad, 
Assistant Treasury Secretary David Cohen provided the 
Pakistanis with a compilation of tearline information on the 
financial activities of terrorist organizations in Pakistan 
-- including their use of the formal financial sector -- and 
affiliated charities, businesses, and individuals. Cohen 
encouraged the Pakistanis to exploit these leads in the 
pursuit of additional inform 
ation to identify key terrorism donors, fundraisers, and 
financial facilitators. Cohen also passed declassified 
terrorism finance information to four Pakistani banks. 

Law Enforcement Assistance 
-------------------------- 

¶8. (SBU) Pakistan's terrorism threats necessitate substantial 
strengthening of the country's law enforcement capabilities. 
The State Department's International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) Bureau is providing significant training, 
equipment, and infrastructure assistance to the police in 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP), i.e., the province most 
affected by terrorist attacks. This assistance -- $40.5 
million in FY2009 and $34.6 million in FY2010 -- focuses on 
the NWFP police's Elite Force, a "heavy" police force with 
SWAT-like capabilities established in 2008. Equipment we 
are providing the Elite Force includes vehicles, armored 
personnel carriers, protective vests, night vision goggles, 
and communications gear. We are hardening police checkpoints 
with Hesco-like barriers and are rebuilding three police 

ISLAMABAD 00000416 003 OF 004 


stations in NWFP's Malakand Division that were destroyed by 
militants. INL is also funding a variety of police training 
courses implemented by the Department of Justice's ICITAP 
program that are open to nationwide participation. 

¶9. (C) The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) program has separate activities aimed at enhancing the 
counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan's law enforcement 
agencies. A key component of the ATA program is focused on 
"hard skills" tactical training, including explosives 
detection and disposal, quick reaction, and VIP protection. 
Unfortunately, the ATA program is now under threat of 
termination. Following false press reports that our ATA 
trainers are using the training center provided by the 
Pakistani government, i.e., the Sihala Police Academy, for 
nefarious purposes -- including to gather information on a 
nearby Pakistan nuclear installation -- the government has 
decided to end our use of that facility and has not yet 
provided an acceptable alternative site. 

Mumbai Case 
----------- 

¶10. (C) Pakistan's prosecution of the seven suspects it 
arrested in the Mumbai case -- i.e., Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) 
operatives Zakiur Rehman Lahkvi, Zarrar Shah, Al-Qama, Shahid 
Jamil Riaz, and Hammad Amin Saqid, and terrorism financiers 
Jamil Ahmed and Younos Anjum -- is proceeding, though at a 
slow pace. The defense lawyers have aggressively filed 
motions challenging varying aspects of the case. On November 
25, an Anti-Terrorism Court finally framed the charges 
against the seven defendants, allowing the court proceedings, 
which are being held in camera, to move to the trial phase. 
Four FBI expert witnesses are expected to be called to 
testify for the prosecution. The government has continually 
reassured us that the prosecutors will win convictions 
against all the defendants after a trial lasting several 
months, though it has a stronger case against the five LeT 
operatives than against the two terrorism financers. There 
are concerns that some of the convictions could be overturned 
at the appellate level, where the courts set an extremely 
high evidentiary bar. On October 12, a Pakistani court 
quashed all remaining cases against Hafiz Saeed, the head of 
LeT alias Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD). Those cases were not 
related to the Mumbai attack. The government has repeatedly 
told us that it would need much more evidence of Saeed's 
direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks to move forward with 
Mumbai-related charges against him. 

David Coleman Headley 
--------------------- 

¶11. (S) In December, an FBI-DOJ team briefed Pakistani 
officials from the ISI, Ministry of Interior, FIA, IB, and 
MFA on the David Coleman Headley investigation, providing 
them with tear-line information on Headley's statements to 
U.S. authorities. ISI officials said they had very little 
information to identify the Pakistanis mentioned in the 
statements. They discussed their investigation into First 
World Immigration Service, a business front used by Headley 
and his co-conspirators. The ISI said while they would not 
grant direct FBI access to co-conspirator Major (retd.) 
Abdurrehman Syed, who was in ISI custody, the FBI could 
submit questions for Syed through the ISI. The FIA and 
Ministry of Interior informed the FBI that it would be 
difficult to introduce Headley-related evidence in the 
government's prosecution of the Mumbai defendants, including 
because Headley's statements to U.S. authorities would be 
treated as hearsay with little evidentiary value in court. 

Sargodha Five 
------------- 

¶12. (C) The Pakistanis continue to pursue their own case 
against the five American citizens from Northern Virginia who 
were arrested in Sargodha, Punjab province, on December 8, 
following suspicions they had travelled to Pakistan to engage 

ISLAMABAD 00000416 004 OF 004 


in jihadist activities. They have not acted on our request 
that the five be returned to the United States. The 
Pakistani prosecutor has repeatedly asked for continuations 
in the case because he is not yet prepared to move forward 
with charges. The five suspects, who claim to have been 
abused while in custody, were denied bail at a February 16 
court hearing. The next hearing will take place sometime in 
March. 

Aafia Siddiqui 
-------------- 

¶13. (C) There has been widespread condemnation here of the 
February 3 guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a 
Pakistani citizen who was tried in Federal Court in New York 
on charges of attempting to murder U.S. soldiers and law 
enforcement authorities in Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis were 
taken by surprise by the verdict because one-sided Pakistani 
media coverage of the case reported only on her defense and 
not the prosecution's case, leading local observers to 
conclude her acquittal was a near certainty. We have 
stressed to the Pakistanis that Siddiqui received a fair 
trial and has a right to an appeal. A number of our 
Pakistani interlocutors have suggested that President Obama 
consider pardoning Siddiqui, and Prime Minister Gilani told 
Senator Kerry on February 16 that Siddiqui should be 
transferred to Pakistan to serve out her sentence here. 
PATTERSON